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1. Introduction 
With trade measures adopted by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Member 
States having moved beyond tariffs and quotas and now covering issues of domestic 
regulation and policy, arguments that trade agreements undermine national 
sovereignty have been advanced.1 Such arguments have been countered by critics 
who regard some of the trade measures adopted in pursuit of free trade as being 
discriminatory and question how such measures can be justified, especially where 
they are employed by developed countries against products originating from 
developing countries.2 Nowhere are these arguments more important than in the 
context of the adjudication of disputes involving WTO Member States' regulation of 
public health-related matters affecting international trade. Such disputes have 
polarized public health advocates and international trade enthusiasts. 
In an effort to disentangle the effect of WTO Member States' adoption of public 
health measures which impact negatively on international trade, the United States - 
∗   See the Appellate Body Report United States-Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of 
Clove Cigarettes WT/DS406/AB/R (April 4, 2012) (hereinafter referred to as Appellate Body 
Report US-Clove Cigarettes). See also the WTO Panel Report United States - Measures Affecting 
the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes WT/DS406/R (September2, 2011) (hereinafter 
referred to as WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes). 
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1  Lester 2012 Free Trade Bulletin. 
2  Voon 2012 ASIL Insights 16. 
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Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes3 case  has become of 
prime interest not only due to its implications regarding balancing the potentially 
conflictual relationship/tensions between trade and health but also due to the 
clarifications it offers concerning the implementation of the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade.4 
The US-Clove Cigarettes case gave the Panel and Appellate Body the opportunity to 
deal with the sometimes irresistible national urge to discriminate against foreign 
products in the guise of public health protection. Failure to address and discipline 
that urge could jeopardise WTO Member States' prospects of benefiting from the 
market opening potential of WTO legal instruments generally, especially the 
provisions of the TBT Agreement and The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures.5 Through a critical examination of the Panel and 
Appellate Body decisions in the US-Clove Cigarettes case, this article seeks to 
demonstrate that in the US-Clove Cigarettes case, the WTO Panel and Appellate 
Body successfully defended both the integrity of WTO Member States' treaty 
commitments and the overarching importance of trade liberalisation within the 
Organisation's policy foundations, where these came under threat by a government 
allegedly acting in defence of public health. It will also highlight the fact that both 
the Panel and Appellate Body failed to duly acknowledge the development-related 
challenges facing those developing countries that are part of the WTO family.  
2. Background to the US-Clove Cigarettes dispute 
In June 2009, the United States (US) government passed the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA), which banned the sale of all 
3  See the Appellate Body Report United States - Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of 
Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R (April 4, 2012) (hereinafter referred to as Appelate Body 
Report US-Clove Cigarettes); and also the WTO Panel Report United States - Measures Affecting 
the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes WT/DS406/R (September2, 2011) (hereinafter 
referred to as WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes). 
4  See the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (1995) (hereinafter TBT Agreement) and the 
Marrakech Agreement Establishing the WTO (1994). 
5  The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (1995) (hereinafter 
SPS Agreement) is an international treaty of the WTO which was negotiated during the Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It entered into force in 1995. 
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flavoured cigarettes except menthol cigarettes.6 The FSPTCA gave the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) broad new statutory authority to regulate tobacco 
products under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.7 It is important to 
observe that in 1996 the FDA had claimed authority to regulate cigarettes. However, 
in the year 2000, in the case of FDA v Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation,8 
the US Supreme Court restricted the FDA from authority to regulate cigarettes. The 
Court held that the US Congress did not intend to allow the FDA to independently 
regulate tobacco products. In particular, section 101(b)(3) of the FSPTCA gives the 
FDA regulatory authority over cigarettes under the FFDCA. Further, section 101 of 
the FSPTCA added a new provision to the FFDCA, section 907(a)(1)(A). This 
section's purpose was described in the US House Report to the Panel as being that 
of protecting public health, including the reduction of smoking among youths.9 
Whilst the FFDCA does not exempt menthol cigarettes from any new regulations, 
section 907(e) requires the US Scientific Advisory Committee to issue a report on the 
impact of menthol cigarettes on public health.  
 
Section 907(a)(1)(A) exempts menthol cigarettes from the ban imposed on the sale 
of cigarettes that contain a herb or spice that is a "characterizing flavour of the 
tobacco product". The exemption provided for in section 907(a)(1)(A) was provided 
for in the FFDCA regardless of the objectives of the FSPTCA being that of providing 
"…the Secretary with proper authority over tobacco products in order to protect the 
public health and to reduce the number of individuals under 18 years of age who 
use tobacco products". Questions could thus be raised as to why menthol cigarettes 
were excluded from the ban if the intention of the legislation was to reduce the 
number of young smokers. Due consideration in this regard should have been given 
to the fact that cigarettes, flavoured or not, have the same type of harmful effects. 
 
6  See the US Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Public Law No. 111-131, 2009 
(FSPTCA). 
7  See the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, United States Code, Title 21 (FFDCA). 
8  FDA v Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation 529 US 120 161 (2000). 
9  See the US House Report to the WTO Panel Exhibit 67, 37, 2011. 
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The US imposed a ban on the importation and sale of flavoured cigarettes in the 
aftermath of the promulgation of the FSPTCA. This prompted Indonesia to request 
the establishment of a Panel to determine whether or not the ban imposed by the 
US was inconsistent with its obligations as a Member State of the WTO.10 
Indonesia's complaint was driven by the fact that before the US ban, the former was 
the largest exporter of clove cigarettes to the later.11 Indonesia thus challenged the 
US regulation against cigarettes containing a flavour, herb or spice that gives a 
characterizing flavour to the product except for menthol cigarettes as provided for in 
section 907(a)(1)(A) of the FFDCA. 
 
3. Arguments of the parties  
 
Indonesia argued that by imposing a ban on clove cigarettes, while continuing to 
allow the sale of menthol cigarettes, the US discriminated against Indonesian 
products and therefore violated its obligation to eschew non-discriminatory trading 
practices as a Member of the WTO.12 Further, Indonesia argued that the passing 
into law of the FSPTCA discriminated against Indonesia because clove cigarettes sold 
in the US before the ban were imported primarily from Indonesia, whilst almost all 
menthol cigarettes sold in the US were produced domestically.13 Indonesia 
contended that section 907(a)(1)(A) of the FFDCA was inconsistent with Article 2.1 
of the TBT. It also argued that in the context of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, a 
determination of "likeness" of products is fundamentally a determination about the 
nature and extent of the competitive relationship among products. The Panel 
acknowledged in this instance that the vast majority of clove cigarettes consumed in 
the US came from Indonesia with one US company, Nat Sherman, being a 
manufacturer of clove-flavoured cigarettes prior to the ban imposed in terms of the 
FSPTCA. This in itself suffices to raise doubts as regards the legitimacy of the US ban 
10  Request for Consultations by Indonesia, US-Clove Cigarettes, 5, WT/DS406/1 (April 4, 2010). 
11  See the US's first written submission to the WTO Panel, para 35. 
12  See Indonesia's Panel Request, WT/DS406/2 2. 
13  See US's first written submission to the WTO Panel, para 35. 
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on clove cigarettes as the ban would have adverse economic effects on Indonesia 
rather than on the US. 
 
Article III: 4 of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides for the 
non-discrimination clause. Indonesia correctly argued that regardless of the 
differences in the characterization of the products, clove and menthol cigarettes 
were "like products". As such, section 907 of the FFDCA violated GATT Article III: 4 
since the US ban applied only to clove cigarettes but not to menthol cigarettes. 
Indonesia's argument is significant if regard is given to the fact that the ban imposed 
on clove cigarettes was carried out on health grounds. Are menthol cigarettes as a 
"like product" not likely to produce the same effect as the banned Indonesian-
produced clove cigarettes? This issue again raised doubts about the legitimacy of the 
US ban on Indonesian produced clove cigarettes.  
 
Of special significance to developing countries, Indonesia also argued that section 
907(a)(1)(A) of the FFDCA violates Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement. Article 12.3 of 
the TBT Agreement, which provides that: "Members shall, in the preparation and 
application of technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment 
procedures, take account of the special development, financial and trade needs of 
developing country Members, with a view to ensuring that such technical 
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures do not create 
unnecessary obstacles to exports from developing country Members." Indonesia 
based its argument on the fact that having demonstrated how Article 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement prohibits the creation of unnecessary barriers to trade, and that clove 
cigarette sales in the US consisted primarily of Indonesian clove cigarettes, the US 
was supposed to take account of the special development and trade needs of 
Indonesia as a developing country Member of the WTO.14 Indonesia advanced its 
case by showing that six million Indonesians were directly or indirectly employed in 
the manufacture of cigarettes and the growing of tobacco.15 The implication of 
Indonesia's argument regarding the alleged Article 12.3 violation is that not only was 
14  See Indonesia's first written submission to the WTO Panel, para 147. 
15  Indonesia's first written submission to the WTO Panel, para 5. 
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the US ban on the sale of Indonesian-produced clove cigarettes a threat to 
Indonesia's economic prosperity but also to the general welfare of its workers and its 
sustainable development.  
In response, the US as signatory to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control16 
rejected Indonesia's claims that section 907(a)(1)(A) was inconsistent with Article 
2.1 of the TBT Agreement.17 The US accused Indonesia of failing to prove that clove 
cigarettes and regular or menthol cigarettes were viewed as "interchangeable" in the 
marketplace.18 Further, the US argued that Indonesia's reliance on the jurisprudence 
developed under GATT Article XX(b) in the context of Article 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement was a "radical approach" that should be rejected.19 Some of the WTO 
case law relied upon by Indonesia included EC-Asbestos20 and Brazil-Retreaded 
Tyres.21 Concerning Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement, the US was of the view that 
Indonesia had failed to demonstrate that it had acted inconsistently with the 
provision.22 The US further argued that Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement did not 
require the developed country Member to accept every recommendation presented 
by the developing country, and the fact that Congress decided to value the public 
health interest over the interests of cigarette manufacturers, both domestic and 
foreign, could not support a credible claim that the US had acted inconsistently with 
Article 12.3.23  
  
16  The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2005) (FCTC) entered into force in 2005 and 
was negotiated in response to concerns about a globalised tobacco epidemic, exacerbated by 
increasing international trade in tobacco and foreign direct investment. Its main objective is to 
reduce the demand for and supply of tobacco. 
17  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes para 6.28. 
18  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes para 6.28. 
19  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes para 7.357. 
20  WTO Appellate Body Report European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos 
Containing Products 99, WT/DS135/AB/R (April 5, 2001) para 172 (hereinafter referred to as 
WTO Appellate Body Report EC-Asbestos). 
21  WTO Appellate Body Report Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres 
WT/DS332/AB/R (December 17, 2007) para 144. 
22  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 162 para 7.602. 
23  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 162 para 7.604. 
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4. WTO Panel decision 
 
In order to establish whether or not products in dispute are like products, the 
standard prescribed is that of comparability. GATT Article III:2 states that the 
degree of similarity required is that the products must be "like". "Likeness" was 
discussed by the WTO Panel Report in the Japan-Alcohol case. The issue in the case 
was whether or not various alcohol beverages were "like" shochu, a traditional 
Japanese drink that was receiving favourable tax treatment in comparison to 
imported products such as vodka. The Panel noted that: 
 
... vodka and shochu shared most physical characteristics … except for filtration, 
there was virtual identity in the definition of the two products … difference in the 
physical characteristics of alcoholic strength of two products did not preclude a 
finding of likeness …. 
 
Using the same reasoning adopted in the Japan-Alcohol case, the Panel found that 
clove and menthol cigarettes were physically similar and both contained an additive 
that provides them with a characterizing flavour.24 It noted the significance of the 
presence of additives in both clove and menthol cigarettes, which it deemed relevant 
on the basis that section 907(a)(1)(A) of the FFDCA is a technical regulation aimed 
at regulating cigarettes which include such additives. The implication of the Panel's 
conclusions is that both clove and menthol cigarettes should have been subjected to 
the same test before a ban could be instituted against either one of the products.  
 
The presence of the additive in menthol cigarettes also raised the significance of the 
technical regulation against clove cigarettes.25 The purpose of a technical regulation 
is subverted if, as the Panel concluded, "…both clove and menthol cigarettes share 
the same end-use of smoking."26  As such, if the perception of the smokers (young 
smokers under the age of 18), as the WTO Panel found, is that flavoured cigarettes 
24  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 78 para 7.240. 
25  Lester, Mercurio and Davies World Trade Law 262. 
26  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 78 para 7.241. 
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are similar for the purpose of starting to smoke,27 then it is illegal to impose a ban 
on clove cigarettes without extending the ban to the production, importation and 
sale of menthol cigarettes.28 Here, the WTO Panel found that clove and menthol 
cigarettes are classified under the same 6-digit HS code, namely 2402.20, which 
makes them "like products". Accordingly, the Panel found that clove and menthol 
cigarettes were like products for the purpose of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. 
The Panel also had to establish whether imported Indonesian clove cigarettes were 
accorded less favourable treatment than that accorded to like products for the 
purpose of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.29 In reaching its decision, the Panel 
concluded that: "The fact that section 907(a)(1)(A) differentiates between like 
products is not in itself sufficient to violate the national treatment obligation 
embodied in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement".30 The Panel found that, by 
forbidding the sale of imported clove cigarettes, section 907(a)(1)(A) accords to 
those cigarettes "less favourable treatment" than it accords to the like domestic 
product, in this case menthol cigarettes.31 
In interpreting the "less favourable treatment" test under Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement, the Panel, as with "likeness," applied the lessons from GATT Article 
III:4.32 The Panel adopted a jurisprudence which reflects a competition-based 
analysis in terms of GATT Article III:1. In the Panel's view, the wording of Article 2.1 
of the TBT Agreement appeared to be modelled on that of GATT Article III:4.33 In 
the Panel's view, "Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and 1994 GATT Article III:4 
impose a similarly worded obligation upon Members to provide imported products 
'treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin'". 
However, whilst placing weight on the similarity of the wording of the two 
provisions, as was done by the Appellate Body in the EC-Asbestos case, the Panel 
noted with caution that "…even to the extent that the terms used are identical, they 
27  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 78 para 7.242. 
28  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 78 para 7.243. 
29  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 79 para 7.248. 
30  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 79 para 7.249. 
31  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 79, para 7.249. See also the WTO Appellate Body Report 
EC-Asbestos para 100. 
32  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 80 para 7.251. 
33  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 80 para 7.253. 
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'must be interpreted in light of the context and of the object and purpose, of the 
provision at issue, and of the object and purpose of the covered agreement in which 
the provision appears'".34 The Panel then reasoned that if the legitimate objective of 
reducing youth smoking informed its analysis on "likeness", then for the same 
reasons, the interrogation of whether clove cigarettes imported from Indonesia were 
accorded "less favourable treatment" than that accorded to the domestic like 
product should be founded on the same objective. 
 
The Panel referred to the case of Korea-Various Measures on Beef in which the 
Appellate Body observed that "whether or not imported products are treated 'less 
favourably' than 'like products' should be assessed … by examining whether a 
measure modifies the conditions of the competition in the relevant market to the 
detriment of imported products."35 Accordingly, the Panel concluded that under 
GATT Article III:4, whether "treatment less favourable" has been accorded to 
imported products compared to like domestic products rests essentially on an 
assessment of the conditions of competition in the relevant market.36 The Panel thus 
concluded that banning clove cigarettes while exempting menthol cigarettes from 
the ban in terms of section 907(a)(1)(A) of the FFDCA accorded imported 
Indonesian clove cigarettes less favourable treatment than that accorded to 
domestic menthol cigarettes for the purposes of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.37 
Further, the Panel had to establish whether or not the US acted inconsistently with 
Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement by failing to take account of the special 
development, financial and trade needs of Indonesia as a developing country 
Member of the WTO.38 In EC-Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, the Panel 
had observed that "Article 12.3 requires that in preparing and applying technical 
34  WTO Appellate Body Report EC-Asbestos paras 88-89. 
35  WTO Appellate Body Report Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen 
Beef WT/DS161, 169/AB/R (January 10, 2001) para 137. See also WTO Panel Report US-Clove 
Cigarettes 82 para 7.264. 
36  WTO Panel Repor, US-Clove Cigarettes 82 para 7.267. 
37  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 89 para 7.291(v). 
38  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 163 para 7.610. 
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regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures, Members should take 
account of the special needs of developing country Members."39  
The Panel also noted that "Article 12.3 is a specific application of the obligation in 
Article 12.2 to take account of developing country needs in the implementation of 
the TBT Agreement at the national level." However, the Panel concluded that the 
formulation "take account of" the special financial, development and trade needs of 
a developing country does not necessarily mean that the Member preparing or 
applying a technical regulation must agree with or accept the developing country's 
position.40 The Panel opted for a rather conservative approach when it found that 
Indonesia's concerns in terms of Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement had been 
subsequently addressed through correspondence with key officials in the US 
Government.41 However, it should be questioned how and why the Panel reached 
such a conclusion when the US subsequent to that exchange of correspondence 
imposed a ban on Indonesian-produced clove cigarettes. Further, the Panel found 
rather strangely that the banning of clove cigarettes served a material legitimate 
objective of reducing youth smoking in the US while at the same time the same 
Panel accepted that the harmful effects of clove and menthol cigarettes are the 
same and that youths do not see any difference in smoking clove or menthol 
cigarettes at the entry point. In the end, the Panel concluded that Indonesia had 
failed to demonstrate that the US acted inconsistently with Article 12.3 of the TBT 
Agreement.  
5. Appellate Body decision 
The Appellate Body drew significantly from its previous jurisprudence regarding the 
national treatment obligation under GATT Article III:4 in assessing the US ban under 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.42 The Appellate Body pointed out that the TBT 
Agreement has no general exceptions provision of the type found in GATT Article 
39  WTO Panel Report European Communities - Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (November 21, 2006) para 7.47 sub-paras 75 and 77. 
40  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 170 para 7.646. 
41  WTO Panel Report US-Clove Cigarettes 170 para 7.645. 
42  Voon 2012 ASIL Insights 2. 
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XX,43 but it indicated that "the balance that the preamble of the TBT Agreement 
strikes between … the pursuit of trade liberalization and … Members' right to 
regulate, is not, in principle, different from the balance that exists between the 
national treatment obligation of GATT Article III and the general exceptions provided 
under the GATT Article XX".44 As a result, the Appellate Body rejected the Panel's 
reliance on the regulatory purpose in assessing the "likeness of products" under 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.45 
The Appellate Body expressed the opinion that "the regulatory concerns underlying a 
measure, such as the health risks associated with a given product" were relevant in 
determining whether or not products are "like" only to the extent that those 
concerns affect the traditional criteria such as "physical characteristics" or "consumer 
preferences,"46 or otherwise "have an impact on the competitive relationship 
between the products".47 The Appellate Body further examined regulatory concerns 
under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement to determine whether or not the challenged 
measure affords "less favourable treatment" to imported Indonesian clove 
cigarettes.48 Regardless of the Appellate Body's placing emphasis on the competitive 
relationship between the clove and menthol cigarettes, its finding that menthol and 
clove cigarettes are "like products" did not rely heavily on an analysis of the actual 
market for flavoured cigarettes as a whole.  
 
The Appellate Body went on to rule that the "treatment no less favourable" 
requirement under the TBT Agreement Article 2.1 prohibits "both de jure (in law) 
and de facto (in fact)49 discrimination against imported products, while at the same 
43  WTO Appellate Body Report US-Clove Cigarettes 40 para 101 and 180. 
44  WTO Appellate Body Report US-Clove Cigarettes 43 para 109. 
45  WTO Appellate Body Report US-Clove Cigarettes 45 para 112. 
46  WTO Appellate Body Report US Clove-Cigarettes 42 para 104. See also the WTO Appellate Body 
Report European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas 
WT/DS27/Ab/R (September 9, 1997) para 216 and 241. Here, the WTO Appellate Body rejected 
the "intent and effect" test for establishing "likeness". 
47  WTO Appellate Body Report US-Clove Cigarettes paras 117 and 119. 
48  WTO Appellate Body Report US-Clove Cigarettes 59 para 160. 
49  Lester, Mercurio and Davis World Trade Law 265. Lester, Mercurio and Davis have noted that 
"De jure discrimination involves discrimination that is apparent on the face of the measure. For 
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time permitting detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for imports that 
stems exclusively from legitimate regulatory distinctions".50 Significantly, the 
Appellate Body made it clear that discrimination contrary to Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement does not arise simply because one imported product is accorded less 
favourable treatment than one domestic like product; rather, the national treatment 
obligation in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement requires members "to accord to the 
group of imported products treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the 
group of like domestic products".51  
Whilst being mindful that the meaning of the term "treatment no less favourable" in 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement is to be determined in the light of the specific 
context of this Agreement, the Appellate Body considered previous rulings on the 
term's meaning in the context of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 instructive. This 
approach guided its ruling on the legality of section 907(a)(1)(A) of the FFDCA, 
which banned the sale of clove cigarettes. Referring to the EC-Asbestos case, the 
Appellate Body reasoned that the "treatment no less favourable clause" of GATT 
Article III:4: 
…expresses the general principle, in Article III:1, that internal regulations "should 
not be applied" … so as to afford protection to domestic production … If there is 
"less favourable treatment" of the group of "like" imported products, there is 
conversely, "protection" of the group of "like" domestic products.52 
 
The "treatment no less favourable" standard of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 
therefore prohibits WTO Members from modifying the conditions of competition in 
the marketplace to the detriment of the group of imported products vis-a-vis the 
group of domestic like products.53 The Appellate Body concluded that the "treatment 
no less favourable" requirement of Article 2.1 prohibits both de jure and de facto 
example a measure may state that imported goods are subject to sales tax of 20% whereas 
domestically produced goods are subject to a sales tax of 10%." 
50  WTO Appellate Body Report US-Clove Cigarettes para 175. 
51  WTO Appellate Body Report US-Clove Cigarettes para 180 and 193. 
52  WTO Appellate Body Report EC-Asbestos para 100. 
53  WTO Appellate Body Report US-Clove Cigarettes para 179. 
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discrimination against a group of imported products.54 However, the Appellate Body 
also reasoned that the context, object and purpose of the TBT Agreement weigh in 
favour of interpreting the "treatment no less favourable" requirement of Article 2.1 
as permitting a detrimental impact on imports that stems exclusively from legitimate 
regulatory distinction.55 Accordingly, the Appellate Body concluded that section 
907(a)(1)(A) modifies the conditions of competition in the US market to the 
detriment of imported clove cigarettes.56 
Regarding the application of Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement, Indonesia's 
argument that the risk of unemployment was an adequate basis upon which the US 
could be held liable for acting inconsistently with the provision was rejected.57 That 
risk of unemployment was held not to be a "special need" given that every 
government is concerned about the unemployment rate among citizens.58 In any 
event, there was no evidence before the Appellate Body that section 907(a)(1)(A) of 
the FFDCA had had any negative impact on employment in Indonesia. 
6. Evaluation of WTO Panel and Appellate Body decisions 
Under the WTO legal framework, countries have great flexibility to design public 
health-related and environmental regulations to have effect only within their 
territories.59 However, the same discretion does not apply to measures that affect 
exports or imports.60 An absence of clear guidelines on how to address issues of 
legality in the regulation of trade-related health matters, especially where developing 
countries trade, points to a legislative oversight on the part of the WTO and its 
Members.61 Be that as it may, health-related trade disputes have resulted in the 
development of valuable jurisprudence by the WTO's Appellate Body. According to 
Sinha, the WTO's Appellate Body reports in the cases of US-Clove Cigarettes and US-
Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
54  WTO Appellate Body Report US-Clove Cigarettes para 181. 
55  WTO Appellate Body Report US-Clove Cigarettes para 181. 
56  WTO Appellate Body Report US-Clove Cigarettes para 214. 
57  See the Executive Summary of the first written submission of Indonesia, WT/DS406/R D-25. 
58  See the Executive Summary of the first written submission of Indonesia, WT/DS406/R D-25. 
59  Houser et al Levelling the Carbon Playing Field 5. 
60  Cosby Trade and Climate Change 7. 
61  Hufbauer et al Global Warming 20. 
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Products62 have re-ignited the debate on the WTO's role in balancing the rights of 
the sovereign to regulate in defence of public health or the environment within its 
domestic domain, with the need to maintain the sanctity of the multilateral trade 
order.63  
The US-Clove Cigarettes case is one of the most controversial health-related 
disputes ever to arise in the history of the WTO; its importance lies in its provision of 
findings and rulings that should assist national trade law and policy makers to 
manage the public health and international trade interface. The case afforded the 
Panel and Appellate Body the opportunity to pronounce on the issues of 
protectionism in the context of what was clearly a genuine need for legitimate health 
regulation. The US-Clove Cigarettes case presents a classic example of how a 
country can promulgate a public health regulatory legislation which may actually 
constitute a disguised form of protectionism.64 While some protectionism is obvious, 
other forms are disguised and can be seen only by examining the product market at 
issue closely.  
In general terms, the Panel and Appellate Body's findings of violation in the Clove 
Cigarettes case were based on the notion that the exclusion of (mostly American) 
menthol cigarettes from the law, while the competing (mostly Indonesian) clove 
cigarettes were prohibited, constitutes protectionism. Even though the US statute is 
origin neutral on its face, and does not have explicitly different rules for imports and 
domestic products, there was clear evidence of the discriminatory nature and effect 
of the statute. This type of discrimination may be disguised or hidden in apparently 
legitimate health measures, but it can be uncovered by looking under the surface, as 
the Appellate Body did in this case. 
 
62  WTO Appellate Body Report United States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing 
and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) (hereinafter referred to as 
WTO Appellate Body Report US-Tuna Dolphin II). 
63  Sinha 2012 Trade, Law and Development 269. 
64  Prior to the US-Clove Cigarettes case, a US law that required domestic cigarette makers to use a 
certain amount of domestically grown tobacco was challenged successfully in the GATT in 1994. 
See the GATT Panel Repor, US Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use of 
Tobacco DS44/R 131. 
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Critics of this decision have expressed concern that this ruling undermines the ability 
of WTO Member States to regulate tobacco for public health purposes.65 In reality, 
though, the only problem with the impugned measure was its discriminatory nature. 
If the law had banned menthol cigarettes as well, a move that health advocates 
supported, it would very likely have been found to be consistent with the WTO rules. 
However, it is significant that both the Appellate Body and the Panel's rulings were 
effectively anti-protectionism in the sense that they prevented the US from adopting 
a trade-related measure contrary to the larger WTO policy of liberalising 
international trade generally and permitting trade-restrictive measures only 
exceptionally. In this regard the rulings deserve to be applauded. 
Drawing a line between protectionist and non-protectionist trade-related measures 
can be difficult. As the Clove Cigarettes case shows, some measures that are 
ostensibly intended for non-protectionist ends are in fact excellent examples of 
disguised protectionism. The Appellate Body and Panel correctly found that the US 
ban on clove cigarettes was inconsistent with obligations arising under 1994 GATT 
Article III:4, because clove and menthol cigarettes were "like products" and the ban 
discriminated against clove cigarettes. Article III:4 prohibits WTO Members from 
passing laws, regulations, or other requirements that treat an imported product less 
favourably than a "like" domestically produced product after it has cleared customs 
and entered the territory of the WTO Member. But the characterization of measures 
as protectionist or not is crucial for establishing applicable trade and investment 
rules, and thus must be examined carefully. In the US-Clove Cigarettes case trade 
and environment-related principles were used as a means of determining the legality 
of specific trade practices. The fact that this may broaden or enhance the legitimacy 
credentials of the WTO, especially within the community of human rights and 
environmental activists, was noted by Sinha when he remarked that: 
It is important to mention … that the legitimacy of the WTO may not necessarily 
stand on the shoulders of sovereign actors alone. Indeed, there could be a case to 
argue that the WTO has the unenviable role of finding legitimacy across its 
economically and culturally diverse constituencies, prominent among which are 
65  Lester 2012 Free Trade Bulletin 2. 
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environmental and human rights activists, regardless of their national or cultural 
affiliation or origin.66 
Similarly, Kulovesi has argued that a "state-centred understanding of legitimacy" can 
"no longer be taken for granted" and also noted that the growing interest in the 
legitimacy and accountability of international organizations "is coupled with re-
invigorated interest in democracy at the inter-state level".67 As such the Appellate 
Body and Panel rulings also curb the sometimes irresistible national pre-disposition 
towards discrimination in favour of domestic products or citizens. This urge makes it 
imperative for the Appellate Body and WTO panels to carefully scrutinise trade-
impacting regulations where, as in this case, the regulation appears to be both 
necessary and scientifically justifiable. 
In the Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,68 
the Panel made the following observations on the applicable standard for evaluating 
if a measure is necessary under GATT Article XX(b): "The import restrictions 
imposed by Thailand could be considered to be necessary" in terms of Article XX(b) 
only if there were no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or 
less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to 
achieve its health policy objectives".69 However in the US-Clove Cigarettes case the 
ban on clove cigarettes was unnecessary, as both the Appellate Body and Panel 
found, because the US could have employed other non-discriminatory policy 
measures capable of accomplishing its intended public health objectives. In the EC-
Hormones case, the WTO Appellate Body held that the legal status of the 
precautionary principle was irrelevant when considering the scientific risk 
assessment and uncertainty under the SPS Agreement.70  
66  Sinha 2012 Trade, Law and Development 269. 
67  Kulovesi WTO Dispute Settlement System 14, 32. 
68  GATT Panel Report Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes 
DS10/R (November 7, 1990) paras 74-75. 
69  Lester, Mercurio and Davies World Trade Law 370. 
70  WTO Appellate Body Report Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen 
Beef WT/DS161, 169/AB/R (January 10, 2001) and WTO Appellate Body Report EC-Asbestos. 
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However, criticism can be directed at the Appellate Body and Panel's decision 
regarding Indonesia's claim of the US violation of Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement. 
If after analysing the competitive relationship between clove and menthol cigarettes, 
the Appellate Body and Panel concluded that imported clove cigarettes and 
domestically produced menthol cigarettes were "like products" under Article III:4, 
then the implication was that the treatment of these "like products" was 
discriminatory under the GATT as the US provided clove cigarettes with drastically 
unequal competitive opportunities in comparison with the opportunities afforded to 
menthol cigarettes. It is important to observe that GATT Article XX's exceptions 
address issues related to balancing trade with other important socio-economic 
policies. Its provisions attempt to draw lines between domestic measures that are 
legitimately used to pursue certain policies and policies that are discriminatory or 
trade restrictive. Therefore if a Member adopts policies that infringe upon another 
with the effect of imposing trade barriers, the result in this regard would be 
economic loss. This could be taken to imply that the US' ban, to the extent that it 
resulted in economic loss and the imposition of a trade ban on Indonesia, was a 
threat to Indonesia's development. 
Competitiveness largely determines trade gains. In the US-Clove Cigarettes case 
both the Appellate Body and Panel appeared to pay little attention to this fact and 
chose to dismiss Indonesia's claims in terms of Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement on 
the basis that the resulting risk of unemployment was not a "special need". 
However, the Appellate Body and Panel could have done more in adopting a 
comprehensive approach which considers the developmental interests of Indonesia 
as a developing country. The linkage between trade and social policies should have 
been considered in this respect. Lester, Mercurio and Davies have observed that: 
 
 Whilst the trade debate in the nineteenth century was almost an economic issue … 
today, by contrast, the trade debate is intimately linked to a wide range of social 
policy issues. This change is a result of a number of factors, including: the 
expanded scope of trade agreements, which are no longer limited to reducing tariff 
duties; [and] the integration of poor countries into the trading system, which has 
resulted in trade between countries with different income levels…"71 
71  Lester, Mercurio and Davies World Trade Law 851. 
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But the clearly minimalist and non-robust approach of the Panel and Appellate Body 
could be explained and justified based on their inclination and preference for 
engaging in judicial economy.72 Having found in favour of Indonesia on the ground 
pertaining to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, it was not really necessary to make 
elaborate findings and conclusions on the claims of violations founded on Article 
12.3. Sunstein has observed that: "Minimalism favours rulings that are narrow, in the 
sense that they govern only the circumstances of the particular case … In law, 
narrow … decisions have real advantages insofar as they reduce decision costs and 
error; [and] make space for democratic engagement on fundamental questions …" 
Perhaps the Panel and Appellate Body's decisions allow room for academic 
engagement on the best possible approach to be adopted in the future regarding 
public health-based trade protectionism. However, Sunstein has also warned that 
judicial minimalism "is hard to justify… Sometimes small steps increase the 
aggregate costs of decisions; sometimes they produce large errors, especially when 
they export decision-making burdens to fallible people".73  This assertion is plausible 
when one considers the cost implication of the Panel and Appellate Body's reluctance 
to robustly pronounce on a matter which has a significant future implication for 
developing countries that stand to benefit from pro-developmental WTO policies and 
decisions.   
 
7. Conclusion 
The US ban on clove cigarettes clearly violated Article III:4 in that, on the findings of 
the Panel and Appellate Body, the predominantly imported clove cigarettes and the 
largely domestically produced menthol cigarettes were "like products" because they 
share the same end-use, are physically similar and have identical tariff 
classifications. Furthermore, while the US ban on clove cigarettes was aimed at 
protecting human health, the verdicts of both the Panel and Appellate Body were 
72  Sunstein 2007 Tulsa Law Review 825. 
73  Sunstein 2007 Tulsa Law Review 825. 
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identical, namely that the regulatory measure discriminated against the imported 
"like products" and afforded them a "less favourable treatment." 
However, regardless of the foregoing, the Panel and Appellate Body lost an 
opportunity to address the special development needs of developing Member States 
in the US-Clove Cigarettes case. If the WTO is to develop a credible reputation as a 
forum for effective dispute resolution in matters where trade inter-connects with 
non-trade matters, then the WTO must adopt a direct approach to addressing 
disguised protectionism aimed at products originating from developing countries. 
Whilst it must be acknowledged that drawing a line between protectionist and non-
protectionist laws may not always be easy, as was the case in the US-Clove 
Cigarettes case, the WTO adjudicating bodies could have taken a more robust 
position in favour of developing countries, even though some of the issues 
implicated might have been too politically sensitive for judicial resolution at the 
WTO.  
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